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COMMENTS
RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALES -
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF REGULATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Credit is not a modem innovation. Legal systems have long pro-
vided for some regulation of simple credit.' However, the recent
growth of credit has been phenomenal.2 It has become an integral part
of our economy. It is widespread, with the majority of our consumer
population participating in some type of credit arrangement. It is no
longer merely a bare arrangement between buyer and seller. Finance
companies, credit unions, 'banks and numerous retail outlets are
involved. No longer does the buyer simply postpone payment until
his crop is harvested. It is now a matter of numerous forms and
complex financial arrangements incorporated in contracts beyond
the comprehension of the average consumer.
The widespread use of installment sales is a relatively recent
development. Reaction to this device of selling to the consumer has
seen a trend in the individual states toward regulation of the credit
sale. Wisconsin has considered a comprehensive scheme of regulation
in this area to supplement the Motor Vehicle Installment Sales Act3
passed in 1935. However, such regulation has not been adopted.
Three considerations have prompted this article: 1) the increased
use of the installment sale, 2) the national trend toward regulation
and 3) the absence of comprehensive legislation in Wisconsin.
This article will trace the historical development of credit regula-
tion and survey legislation enacted in various states, drawing the
common elements from such legislation.
II. INCRESE IN THE AMOUNT OF CONSUMER CREDIT
The phenomenal growth of consumer credit is shown on the charts
in this section. From 1939 to 1961 there was a rapid increase in the
amount of consumer credit. The only exception was the intervention
of World War II. Then, goods were diverted from public consumption
to war production. Total installment credit outstanding in 1939 was
approximately 4 2 billion dollars. In 1961, installment credit out-
standing stood at 42 billion dollars, ten times as much. In a corres-
ponding period (1941-61), personal consumption expenditures rose
from 81 billion dollars to 328 billion dollars, only four times as
much. This makes apparent the widespread popularity of the install-
ment sale.
Financial institutions, as opposed to retail outlets, hold the majority
I NErFFLD, NEIFELD'S MANUAL ON CONSUMER CREDIT V. (1961).
2 See Charts A, B, C and D infra.3 WIS. STAT. ch. 218 §218.016 (1959).
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of installment credit outstanding. Commercial banks predominate,
holding well over 16 billion dollars in installment credit paper. Finance
companies are the next largest holders with well over 10 billion dollars
outstanding. The remainder is held by credit unions, consumer finance
companies and various retail outlets.
The following charts speak for themselves. Volume itself is not
a reason for regulation. It does, however, illustrate the extent to
which installment credit has permeated our economy. This, coupled
with the possibility of abuses and the need for disclosure as to terms
and rates by the seller, has undoubtedly influenced the trend toward
regulation.
CHART A
CREDIT OUTSTANDING4
End of Year Totals
Millions of Dollars
INSTALLMENT NON-INSTALLMENT
YEAR TOTAL CREDIT CREDIT*
1939 7,222 4,503 2,719
1941 9,172 6,085 3,087
1945 5,665 2,462 3,203
1954 32,464 23,568 8,896
1955 38,807 28,883 9,924
1956 42,262 31,648 10,614
1957 44,848 33,745 11,103
1958 44,984 33,497 11,487
1959 51,331 39,034 12,297
1960 55,757 42,588 13,169
1961 54,902 42,181 12,721
*Non-Installment Credit includes single-payment loans, charge accounts and
service credits.
CHART B
TYPE OF INSTALLMENT
CREDIT OUTSTANDING5
End of Year Totals
Millions of Dollars
0
1939 4,503
1941 6,085
1945 2,462
1954 23,568
1955 28,883
1956 31,648
1957 33,745
1958 33,497
1959 39,034
1960 42,588
1961 42,181
447 FED. RESERVE BULL.
cember, 1961.
5 Ibid.
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1456 (1961). The figures are up to and including De-
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CHART C
INSTALLMENT CREDIT BY HOLDERG
Millions of Dollars
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
-3
1939 3,065
1941 4,480
1945 1,776
1954 19,450
1955 24,375
1956 26,905
1957 29,078
1958 28,514
1959 33,359
1960 36,974
1961 37,191
RETAIL OUTLETS
0
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439 183 123
496 206 188
240 17 28
984 377 463
1,044 365 487
1,187 377 502
1,210 361 478
1,128 292 506
1,225 310 481
1,107 333 359
1,014 315 359
CHART D
CONSUMPTION OF GOODST
Billions of Dollars
ANNUAL TOTALS
1929 1933 1941 1950 1956 1957
104.4 56.0 125.8 284.6 419.8 442.8
79.0 46.4 81.9 195.0 269.9 285.2
92 3.5 9.7 30.4 38.5 40.4
37.7 22.3 43.2 99.8 131.4 137.7
32.1 20.7 29.0 64.9 100.0 107.1
0
657
759
629
911
1,049
1,129
1,195
1,282
1,407
1,481
1,508
O
0
339
395
270
1,052
1,101
1,269
1,226
1,175
1,368
1,402
1,205
1958 1959 1960
444.5 482.8 504.4
293.2 314.0 328.9
37.3 43.5 44.3
141.6 147.3 152.4
114.3 123.2 132.2
6 Id. at 1457. Consumer finance companies included with "other" financial in-
stitutions until Sept. 1950.
7Id. at 1474.
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III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CREDIT REGULATION
Before going into the historical development of retail credit regu-
lation, the function of the modern concept of credit should be con-
sidered. This article will not attempt to weigh the pros and cons of
consumer credit as a part of economic theory." Economic questions,
such as the use of credit restrictions to control inflation, are beyond the
sope of this article.
Installment credit has unquestionably played an important role in
the development of our economy. It has been viewed as:
.... a means of adaptation by both consumers and business to
technological, economic, and social developments that have
transformed the consumer into an owner of capital goods that
provide him with services.9
The function of installment credit is to make goods available to the
consumer, before and during the payment period. This enables the
consumer to enjoy goods, especially durables, to an extent that would
have been inconceivable a century ago. Although, credit in a sense,
is nothing more than deferred cash payment, it helps to expand the
economy much more than mere cash buying. Rather than save for
each individual purchase, the consumer may acquire the item before
he has the total cash price. This promotes greater purchasing in our
economy. Coupled with the large amount of consumer goods now
available, it has led to the present, high volume of installment sales.
From the consumer's point of view, credit provides a method of
amortizing the cost of high priced durables over a convenient repay-
ment period.'0 In times of emergency, it enables many to overcome
the dangers of temporary financial crisis." Credit also has a psycho-
logical aspect, in that it enables some to "keep up with the Joneses."
Credit in its simplest form, that is, the sale of goods or services
with payment postponed, probably outdates recorded history. Pro-
visions effecting credit appeared in the earliest legal systems.' 2 Simple
credit was a natural outgrowth of social contact. It is safe to assume
that there have always been those who want in the present and pay
in the future.
The seeds of modern installment credit were planted by what is
commonly known as the "Industrial Revolution" of the 18th and 19th
centutries. Our society passed from an agricultural, home-producing
sSee generally I BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, CON-
SUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT pt. 1 (1957). In regard to consumer credit and
economic instability see pp. 205-32. As to consumer installment credit in rela-
tion to economic stability see pp. 235-53.
9 Id. at 21.
10 DAUTEN, FINANCING THE AMERICAN CONSUMER 3-21 (Consumer Credit Mono-
graph No. 1, 1956).
1 Id. at 4.
12NEIF=Uj, supra note 1, at v.
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economy to an industrialized and urbanized economy.13 As a result
of the industrial expansion large amounts of consumer goods became
available. Credit has played a major part in moving these goods from
the factory to the home.
The magniture of credit today is far beyond what it was at the
turn of the century. Before the modern practices of installment
selling developed, several natural restraints in our economy had to be
overcome. The financing plans that we are familiar with today did
not develop until the 20th century.14 It has been suggested that the
delay in the development of installment selling was due to a variety
of economic, social and psychological factors outside of the law.'5
Whatever the cause of delay, credit as a device for the sale of goods
has now matured. Coincident with the development of credit has been
the development of regulation. The beginning was the usury statute.
Installment sales legislation has paralleled the recent boom in con-
sumer credit.
Regulation of lending is ancient in origin. From the Code of
Hammurabi to the present, legal systems have placed prohibitions on
the taking of excessive interest by lenders.'6 The Bible prohibited the
taking of interest in any form.' 7 The denial of interest in any form
was incorporated into an early English statute.' In 1545, the taking
of interest up to ten percent was legalized in England."9 This is the
forerunner of our modern usury statutes.20 Although usury laws are
generally considered as only applied to a loan or forbearance of
money, they are relevant to a discussion of installment sales regulation.
A few jurisdictions have applied their usury statutes to installment
sales. Therefore, in a discussion of credit regulation the applicability
of usury statutes must be considered.
Two approaches have been employed in the regulation of credit:
legislation by individual states and application of existing usury laws.
The main trend has been state control in various degrees. A small
number of jurisdictions have attempted to regulate the charge on
'1 WrITNEY, THE LAW oF MODERN CommEcrAL PRAcIicEs §§3-4 (1958).
14 Isaacs, Instalment Selling: The Relation Between Its Development in Modern
Business and the Law, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 141 (1935).
21 Id. at 142. The author suggests these elements: (a) the types of purchaser;
(b) the types of article; (c) the conditions of competition and the practices of
trades; (d) popular prejudices; (e) the presence or absence of faciclitating
institutions ; 6) the legal environment or setting.
1 ONE Em, supra note 1, at 52.
17 "Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother; usury of money, usury of
victuals, usury of anything that is lent upon usury." DEuTERoNoMY, xxiii, 19,
20. See also, LEvrrcus, xxv, 35-37.
Is Berger, Usury in Installment Sales, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 148, 157 (1935).
The statute was 11 HEN. VIII, c. 8 (1494), which prohibited the taking of any
interest on a loan of money.
'1 Ibid. Statute 37 HEN. VIII, c. 9 (1545) Section II.
20 WI. STAT. ch. 115 (1959).
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installment sales by applying usury laws to the sale.21 There has been
considerable controversy over the propriety of applying usury laws
to the installment sale.22
Usury as applied to installment sales will be considered next, fol-
lowed by an examination of modern legislation affecting customer
credit.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF USURY STATUTES TO INSTALLMENT SALES
The majority position in the United States is that the general usury
statutes do not apply to installment sales. 2  This position is the result
of the time-sale doctrine. 24 This doctrine holds that the seller may
legitimately charge one price for a cash sale and and another, greater
price for a sale with payment extended over a period of time. The
sale of goods does not fall within the prohibition of usury statutes
because there is neither a loan of money nor a forbearance; there
being no money received by the purchaser and no money due until
the date of each installment payment.2 5
The traditional distinction between usury and the time-sale has
been on the basis of the position of the borrower.26 The courts have
felt that a person borrowing money will often be in difficult straits
and easy prey for unscrupulous lenders, thus in need of the pro-
tection of the usury statutes. But, the purchaser is not in the same
position since he may always refrain from consummating the sale. The
Court in General Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich 27 explained the reason
that usury statutes were not applied to a sale:
21 Limiting Consumer Credit Charges by Reinterpretation of General Usury Laws
and By Separate Regulation, 55 Nw. U. L. Rv. 303 (1960).
22 Compare Berger, supra note 18, who argues that based on historical precedents
usury laws should be applied to installment sales, with Ecker, Commentary on
"Usury in Instalment Sales," 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 173 (1935), who argues
that this is not a legitimate conclusion and that usury laws were never meant
to control anything like modern consumer credit.
2391 C. J. S. Usury §18 (b) (1955) ; §55 AM. Ju. Usury §21 (1946) ; Limiting
Consumer Credit Charges by Reinterpretation of General Usury Laws and By
Separate Regulation. supra note 21. Forty-six of the fifty states have usury
statutes (all but Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire). Id. at
303.
The generally recognized elements of usury are set forth in RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS §526 comment (b) (1932) : "1) a loan or agreement for forbear-
ance; 2) the loan, extended debt or claim forborne must be of money or
something circulating as money, 3) the debt must be unconditionally repayable;
4) something must be exacted or promised for the use of money in addition
to the highest rate of interest permitted by law.
24 Beete v. Bidgood, 7 B. & C. 453, 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1827), is the leading
English case. Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115 (1861), is the leading
case in the United States.2 5 Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 Wash. 2d 378, 156 P. 2d 408 (1945); Hogg v. Ruffner,
supra note 24, at 119, where the court stated: "Such a contract has none of
the characteristics of usury; it is not for the loan of money, or forbearance
of a debt."
26 General Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 262 S.W. 425 (1924).
27 Ibid.
[Vol. 45
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The reason is that the statute against usury is striking at and
forbidding the exaction or receipt of more than a specified legal
rate for the hire of money and not of anything else; and a
purchaser is not like the needy borrower, a victim of a rapacious
lender, since he can refrain from the purchase if he does not
choose to pay the price asked by the seller.28
The distinction is also justified on the basis of the seller's need to
cover the cost of doing business on credit and as an adjunct to his
right to fix his own price.29
The variance of treatment accorded a loan and a sale on time has
been criticized as unfounded in historical precedent. 30 The distinction
has been attacked as blind adherence to unreasoned precedent.31 It has
been quesitoned as a distinction difficult to understand. 32 Opposition to
this criticism is based on precedent beginning with Hogg v. Ruffner."3
Regardless of precedent, it is argued that a fixed charge rate on
installment sales is unrealistic and economically unfeasible.
34
The usury statutes were not enacted with installment sales in mind.
They appeared long before the present boom in consumer credit.
Consequently, they are in no way designed to control the installment
sale. Their operation is properly confined to the prevention of excessive
interest taking on a loan or forbearance of money. It is clear that,
aside from the pros and cons of this argument, the majority of
jurisdictions in the United States are inclined to maintain the now
traditional distinction between a loan and a time-sale.
A minority of jurisdictions have recently applied usury statutes
281d. at 428.
29 Gilbert v. Mudgens, 92 Colo. 571, 22 P. 2d 858 (1938); Equitable Credit &
Discount Co. v. Geier, 342 Pa. 445, 21 A. 2d 53 (1941) ; Hafer v. Spaeth, supra
note 25.
30 Berger, supra note 18. The author of this article painstakingly examines the
development of usury statutes and English cases interpreting them. He con-
cludes that originally there was no distinction between usury on a loan and
usury on a sale of goods.31 Usury Statutes and Installment Sales, 48 YALE L. J. 1102 (1939).
32Limiting Consumer Credit Charges by Reinterpretations of General Usury Laws
and by Separate Regulation, supra note 21, at 304, the author states: "It is
difficult to understand why a consumer should be granted the protection of
the usury statute when he makes a loan to facilitate a purchase, but is denied
that protection when he makes the same purchase on credit granted by the
dealer."
33Supra note 24.
34 Meth, A Contemporary Crisis: The Problem of Usury in the United States,
44 A.B.A.J. 637 (1958) ; Ecker, supra note 22, at 174. The author also refutes
the argument that usury laws should be applied to a sale because they might
have been originally:
The fact of the matter is that the court in the case of Beete v. Bidgood
was influenced-and properly so-by the 'rising tide of commercialism' to cast
aside the 'canonical notion' that a bona fide sale on terms of a deferred pay-
ment of the sales price is in the same category as a loan; and that the court
was cognizant of the necessity, in a commercial as distinguished from a
'canonical' world, of freeing commercial transactions which depend on the
extension of credit from the dangers of forfeiture and penalty.
19621
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to installment sales.-5 These cases generally recognize the validity of an
increased price in a sale on time,36 but they strike at the transaction
in question as not being bona fide credit sales. The question in these
cases does not essentially seem to be accepting or rejecting the tra-
ditional time-sales doctrine, but a question of fact: are these transactions
bona fide credit sales or merely loans disguised as legitimate in-
stallment sales.
These states have not rejected the time-sale doctrine. They do
scrutinize the particular transaction with greater emphasis on the
usury aspects. In certain circumstances, they will find the dealings are
in essence a loan.
3 7
These encroachments on the doctrine do not apply to the question
of law, but to the approach to the fact questions involved .3 As to the
issue of law, these decisions conform to the traditional view that
the transactions must be a bona fide time-sale and the courts will
not allow the transaction to be a "cloak for usury." 39 The majority
approaches the time-sale as a transaction essentially different in nature
than a loan. Unless the arrangement is clearly a subterfuge, they
will refuse to apply or consider application of the usury statutes. The
minority of jurisdictions quickly bridge the gap between a loan and
time-sale, applying more rigid standards to the transaction.
The motives of the minority seem to be to exercise a stricter su-
pervision of financing procedures by the use of the usury statutes.40
35 See Raffel, Conditional Sales Contracts and Usury Laws, 76 BANKING L. J.
829 (1959).
36 See, e.g., Hare v. General Contract Purchase Co., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W. 2d
973 (1952). The court states:
We leave unimpaired the doctrine that a seller may, in a bona fide trans-
action, increase the price to compensate for the risk that is involved in a
credit sale. But there may be a question of fact as to whether the so-called
credit price was bona fide as such, or only a cloak for usury. [Id. at 978.]
See, also, Seebold v. Eustermann, 216 Minn. 566, 13 N.W. 2d 739 (1944); Mc-
Nish v. Grand Island Finance Co., 164 Neb. 543, 83 N.W. 2d 13 (1957).
37 These circumstances are generally: 1) where there is close cooperation between
the finance company and seller. The court may find that the dealer is in reality
the agent of the finance company. What in form appears to be an installment
sale will be considered in essence to be a loan. Limiting Consumer Credit
Charges by Reinterpretation of General Usury Laws and by Separate Regu-
lation, supra note 21, at 305-307. 2) where there is too close a relation between
the buyer and the finance company, the two parties directly negotiating the
terms or the finance company imposing terms on the buyer and seller. Id. at
307-308.
The author of the law review article referred to feels that the time-sale
doctrine is being eroded in several states in cases involving these situations:
1) cooperation between the dealer and the finance company, 2) contact prior
to the sale between the buyer and the finance company, 3) improper or mis-
leading itemization of charges, indicating the lack of a genuine time price,
or 4) refinancing. Id. at 304-310.
38 Raffel, supra note 35, at 830.
39 See, e.g. Jackson v. Commercial Credit Corp., 90 Ga. App. 352, 83 S.E. 2d 76
(1954) ; 6 WILLISTON CoNaRACrs §1687(3) n. 7 (rev. ed. 1938).
40 Raffel, supra note 35, at 830.
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As this has been a very recent trend in this area of the law,4'
it is possible that other jurisdictions will adopt the same approach.
However admirable the desire to protect the consumer, this seems to
be the wrong approach. As suggested previously, usury laws are
unduly harsh and were formulated before the present boom in con-
sumer credit. The better approach appears to be through legislation,
leaving the usury statutes to perform their traditional function, the
regulation of money-lending.
V. DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN LEGISLATION AFFECTING
CONSUMER CREDIT
Legislation affecting consumer credit may be categorized in two
ways: 1) regulation seeking to produce effects on our general eco-
nomic welfare, and 2) regulation which protects the individual con-
sumer.
Regulation For Economic Effect
It is apparent that the volume of consumer credit has a direct effect
on our national economy. Although the extent of the effect may be
questioned, control of the volume of credit can have an inflating or de-
flating effect. The Federal government has periodically passed legisla-
tion in regard to consumer credit. The government may control con-
sumer credit indirectly through monetary policy or directly through
devices such as Regulation W.42 Regulation W directly restricted the
use of consumer credit.43 It was a measure designed to prevent infla-
tion.44 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System re-
cently recommended that it not be used presently to combat infla-
tionary trends.4 s Federal control of the level of consumer credit is
basically an economic question. Whether it should be used during peace-
time is highly debatable. 46 This phase of consumer credit regulation
41 A Minnesota case has been cited as the "bell-weather" case. The case is See-
bold v. Eustermann, 216 Minn. 566, 13 N.W. 2d 739 (1944). Minnesota recently
held that bona fide installment sales do not come within the operation of the
usury statutes. Van Asperen v. Darling Olds Inc., 254 Minn. 64, 93 N.W. 2d
690 (1958).
42 12 C.F.R. pt. 222 (1949), revoked, 14 Fed. Reg. 3742 (1949), reinstated, 32A
C.F.R. ch. XV (1951), suspended, 17 Fed. Reg. 4256 (1952).
43 Uusury in Instalment Selling, 9 ALA. L. REv. 319 (1957). The regulation cov-
ered installment sale of and loans for certain classes of consumer goods. It
fixed the minimum down payment and maximum maturity time. Compare,
Weisner, Regulation W Reimposed, 4 PEas. F.L.Q. REP. 1 (1950).
44 NEIFELD, supra note 1, at 226. Id. at 213-245, covers extensively Federal control
of consumer credit.
45 Regulation of Consumer Instalment Credit: Views of the Board of Governors,
43 FED. REsERvE BuLL. 647 (1957) :
... the Board of Governors believes that a special peacetime authority to
regulate consumer instalment credit is not now advisable. The Board feels
that the broad public interest is better served if potentially unstabilizing
credit developments are restrained by the use of general monetary measures
and the application of sound public and private fiscal policies. [Id. at 648.]
46 NEiFELD, supra note 1, at 234-238 for the pros and cons on Federal regulation
of consumer credit.
1962]
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has been mentioned briefly to illustrate one of the two alternate ways
in which legislation may affect credit. This type of regulation deals
with the volume of credit rather than specific protection for the
individual consumer.
Regulation Protecting the Individual Consumer
The effect of specific legislation in regard to consumer credit will
be dealt with later in this article. This section will trace briefly the
historical development of such legislation.
The need for consumer credit regulation has arisen in connection
with oppressive practices employed by some sellers and lenders.4 7
Such practices as concealing the true interest rate4" and "kickbacks" to
dealers by finance companies49 have greatly increased public pressure
for regulation.
Regulation of consumer credit took place initially within the
framework of existing legal principles5" and has branched out into
several areas of specific regulation. The legal development is aptly
characterized in a statement by Dr. Louis N. Robinson, appearing in
Neifeld's Manual on Consumer Credit:51
Consumer credit is a new business, or rather several new busi-
nesses. Now most new businesses have three legal stages. The
first stage is marked by the attempt to use existing legal tech-
nique which had been evolved in the course of time to handle
other businesses somewhat akin in character to the new busi-
nesses. This old technique, seldom, if ever, fits the new busi-
nesses and as a result, it is conducted partly outside the law and
partly hampered and restricted by existing ill-fitting law ...
The second stage of legal existence is the period of experi-
mentation when legislation attempting to regulate or curb the
business in one or more of its expressions is passed at the
request of an indignant but ill-informed public.
Finally, there is the third stage-when the new business has
been brought under law carefully and scientifically worked out
to enable the business to live a useful life for the benefit of
society.5
2
Specific legislation may be directed toward the business of cash
47 Hubachek, The Drift Toward a Consumer Credit Code, 16 U. CHI. L. REv.
609, 615 (1949). These practices may be grouped in roughly five categories:
1) concealment of the fact that the transaction is a loan; 2) use of a collateral
transaction, such as the sale of something to the borrower on which the lender
makes a profit; 3) exaction of charges ostensibly for something other than the
use of money, e.g., charges for "services"; 4) in the case of installment loans,
discount of the maximum rate of interest permitted by the general usury law
with the interest computed on the original amount of the loan for the full
period of the contract; without regard to the declining principal balance; and
5) fraud.
48 DAUTEN, supra note 10, at 64.
49Ibid.
50 Cf., text accompanying note 16 supra.
51 NEIFELD, supra note 1.
52 Id. at 86-7.
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lending or the business of retail installment selling. Regulation of retail
installment selling developed at a slower pace than in the area of
cash lending. But, it is now gathering momentum and is rapidly
maturing.
Regulation of cash lending has seen a full evolution of legal de-
velopment. Originally, the existing legal framework, consisting of usury
statutes was applied to this business.53 Since the usury statutes often
did not permit sufficient returns to cover costs and profits, abuses
became widespread.5 4 The widespread needs of consumers resulted in
legislation allowing loans at a rate greater than allowed by the usury
statutes. This legislation has generally passed through the second
and to the third stage of legal development. Legislation has been
formulated in three areas: installment loan legislation,55 credit unions56
and individual bank legislation.57
As noted before, legislation regulating the financing of retail in-
stallment sales has developed at a slower rate than that affecting the
business of cash lending. Retail installment sales have been generally
free from regulation due to the time-sale doctrine.58 The first wide-
spread regulation dealt with the sale of automobiles. Separate legisla-
tion covering that area has been enacted in many jurisdictions.5 9
Now rapidly developing are acts covering retail installment sales of
goods other than automobiles. These statutes protect the consumer
primarily by requiring full disclosure of terms and limiting the per-
missible time-price differential.0 The trend is definitely toward regu-
lation. This may be considered a problem for the consumer financing
industry.6' Increased regulation will force a general tightening of
lending practices. The virtue of regulation, provided it allows lend-
ing institutions and sellers to meet the additional cost of extending
53 NEiFELD, supra note 1, at 87.
54 Ibid.
5 Twenty-three states have statutes regulating installment loans for consumer
financing. Limiting Consumer Credit Charges by Reinterpretation of General
Usury Laws and By Separate Regulation, supra note 21, at 310-13. These acts
are to be distinguished from small loan acts. They generally allow rates lower
than small loan acts, but greater than general usury statutes. Id. at 311. Such
statutes restrict the size of the loan applied to, the period of time the loan
may run, amount of interest to be computed and other various restrictions or
allowances. Id. at 311-312.
-6 Only four states-Delaware, Nevada, South Dakota and Wyoming-do not
have laws regulating credit unions. Credit unions are generally regulated as
to the size of the loan, amount of interest permissible and period of repayment.
Id. at 313-316.
57 Commonly called Morris Plan Banks. The plans enable industrial loan com-
panies to charge a greater amount of interest than allowed by the usury
statute. Their importance is generally declining. Id. at 315.58 Supra note 24.
59 E.g., Wis. STAT. ch. 218, §218.016 (1959).60 The difference between the cash price and the installment sales price. See the
consideration of individual state statutes, infra.
61 DAuTx, supra note 10.
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credit, is that it protects the ordinary consumer. The difficulty in
computing the true cost of financing and sharp practices previously
noted 62 call for protection. The consumer is many times unwary and
ill-equipped to analyze the ramifications of an installment sales con-
tract. Legislation calling for a clear and prominent description of the
actual terms, coupled with the other recommended safeguards, should
provide some measure of protection for the buyer,63 without crippling
the industry or economy.
This survey of the development of regulation leads to an examina-
tion of pertinent state statutes now in effect. The common elements
of these statutes will be examined. The authors hope that this will help
to complete the picture of what has been done in regard to control
of credit arrangements.
A. RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALES LEGISLATION
This section of the article is devoted to a consideration of the
regulatory legislation that has been passed in the retail installment
sales field. State regulation of the retail installment sale began in
1935. In that year Indiana enacted a so-called all goods act (that is,
one of general application) 64 and Wisconsin enacted a regulation of
automobile financing.65 As of 1959, 31 states had enacted at least some
type of Retail Installment Sales Legislation.
66
There have been several attempts at model bills; however none have
received any wide spread acceptance nor have resulted in agree-
ment on the essential requisites of adequate regulation. 7 The Russell
Sage Foundation, which drafted the Uniform Small Loans Law, pro-
posed a Preliminary Draft of a Uniform Law to Regulate Installment
Selling in 1940 but discontinued its work shortly thereafter. 68 A com-
mittee of the National Foundation of Small Loan Supervision pro-
posed An Installment Sales Act Relating To Motor Vehicles in 1948
and in 1953 the same committee issued a report advocating regulation
which would cover all installment sales financing.69 Professor Mors
62 See supra note 47.
63 See the consideration of individual state statutes infra.
64 IND. LAWS of 1935, ch. 231.
65 WIs. LAWS of 1935, ch. 474.
66 CORMAN, SALES AND SECURED FlNANCING (1960) ; See also 25 Mo. L. REv. 239
(1960) "Today at least the following 30 states have statutes of this general
type: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Wisconsin."
67 Britton and Ulrich, The Illinois Retail Installment Sales Act-Historical Back-
ground and Comparative Legislation, 53 Nw. U. L. REv. 137 (1958).
68 Id., citing Glenn, Brandt and Andrews, Russell Sage Foundation (1907-1946),
544 (1947).
69 Supra note 67, citing the Report to the National Conference of State Small
Loan Supervisors by the Committee Appointed to Study the Regulation of Sales
Financing Companies (1948) and (1953).
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has also advocated regulation in the retail installment sales field.70
The American Finance Conference, a trade association of independent
finance companies, has proposed model acts.71 However, none of these
model acts has made a lasting impression and as a result, the state
legislation is almost as diverse as the number of states that have
enacted it.
The chart which follows has broken the legislation down into fifteen
different headings. Each of the headings represents a problem area in
which some or all of the states passing Retail Installment Sales Legis-
lation have found regulation necessary. It should also be noted that
the acts vary as to the scope of their coverage. As to coverage they
mzy be classified as 1.) all goods acts, 2.) all goods other than motor
vehicles acts, 3.) motor vehicle acts and 4.) revolving credit account
acts.7 2 The chart below deals with all goods acts and all goods other
than motor vehicle acts. However it should be noted that Connecticut
and Maryland, while having all goods acts, regulate financing charges
only as to motor vehicle sales. The revolving credit account acts and
the motor vehicle acts will be discussed later.
The following matter will consider each of the problem areas
indicated by Chart E and attempt to extract the common elements
from the various state regulations in each of those areas. Because of
the wealth of material contained in these acts and their wide di-
vergence as to substantive content, this may be a somewhat imperfect
approach, but the authors feel that it will aid in an understanding of
the Retail Installment Sales Legislation on a national basis.
L Licensing
Several states make no requirement of obtaining a license to do
business in the retail installment sales field.73 All of those states which
do require a license, require it of the sales finance company,74 except
Florida which requires a license of those ". . . conducting, engaging
in, and carrying on the business of a retailer seller . . ."" A sales
finance company is typically defined as "a person engaged in whole
or in part, in the business of purchasing retail installment contracts
70 Supra note 67, citing Mors, State Regulation of Retail Installment Financing-
Progress and Problems, 23 J. Bus. U. CH. 199 (1950) and 24 J. Bus. U. CH.
43 (1951).
71Id. See, also, COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1959 HANDBOOK OF
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMiMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 205.
7225 Mo. L. REv. 239 (1960).
72 See Chart E.
74 KAN. LAWS SPEC. SEss. (1958), Ch. 9 §16-503; MONT. STAT. 74-603 (1959);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §43-310 (Cum. Supp. 1959), all regulate the "sales finance
company." N. J. LAws OF 1960, ch. 40 §2 regulates those "engaged in the busi-
ness of a sales finance company or in the business of a motor vehicle install-
ment seller." IND. STAT. ANN. §58-911 (1951) regulates "all persons who pur-
chase retail installment contracts from a retail seller....
7 5 FLA. STAT. ANN., §520.32 (Supp. 1958).
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(k) 42-95 38-33
Delaware 4303 to 4309 4323 4315 4307
4306 4318 4340
4334 4319
4336 4332
4337
Florida 520.32 520.40 520.34 520.34 520.34 520.34 520.34
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from one or more sellers. ' 76 Thus the only state that has found it
desirable to license the retail seller himself is Florida and it should
be noted in connection with the Florida statute that the licensing
arrangement appears to be not much more than a revenue measure.1
7
However, the statutes that do require a license of the sales finance
company impose some meaningful regulation. Indiana presents a
typical example. The statutes require reports by the licensee7 8 and
examination of the licensees.79 The license shall not be granted unless
"... the department shall find that the applicant can operate its
business economically and efficiently . . .,"I The license shall be re-
voked if the licensee refuses to submit to the required examination
or if he willfully refuses to comply with the rules of the department
or the provisions of the act."'
The licensing power can, of course, be a very powerful weapon in
the hands of the state. Violation of the retail installment sales acts can
be dealt with much more swiftly and without the heavy burden of
proof imposed upon the state by a criminal statue. It would seem
to the authors that this weapon could be used against the retail seller
with the same force that it is used against the purchaser of retail
paper. In view of the fact that no state has required licenses of retail
sellers, the necessity for this type of regulation should be well estab-
lished before the legislature acts in this area.
II. Waiver
Almost every state that has a retail installment sales act has a
provision making unenforceable and void, a waiver by the buyer of the
rights protected or granted to him by the act. The language of these
provisions is basically very simple and direct. 82 These sections rest upon
the philosophy, even when fully appraised of the contents of the con-
tract of sale, that the buyer is not capable of protecting himself. A
provision such as this seems to be essential to any comprehensive
retail installment sales legislation.
III. Disclosure
Provisions requiring disclosure by the seller represent one of the
basic philosophies of the retail installment sales acts. That is, if the seller
is required to state the essential terms of the contract in such a manner
76 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN., §45-302 (Cum. Supp. 1957).
77 FLA. STAT. ANN., §520.32 and §520.33 (Supp. 1958).
78 IND. STAT. ANN., §58-918 (1951).
79 IND. STAT. ANN., §58-919 (1951).
80 IND. STAT. ANN., §58-913 (1951).81 IND. STAT. ANN., §58-915 (1951).
82 OHIO Pv. CODE ANN., §1317.10 (1957) is a typical provision: No agreement
of any retail buyer made concurrent with or prior to the execution of any
retail installment sales contract is a waiver of sec. 1317.01 to 1317.11 inclusive,
of the revised code.
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that the average consumer can understand exactly what he is contracting
for, the parties should be left to freely contract among themselves. This
philosophy is always tempered somewhat by the philosophy mentioned
in connection with the disclosure provisions, that the buyer is unable to
protect himself. However, the two must be considered together as a
whole and as acting upon one another.
It will be noticed that every state has some provisions regulating dis-
closure and that in most states the provisions are relatively detailed.8 3
Every state requires that the contract be in writing and be signed by the
parties.8 4 Usually the contract is required to be dated s and the printed
portions thereof are required to be in a minimum size of type, usually
8 point.8,6 Specific portions of the contract are required to be in a
larger type. 7 The contract is required to contain certain items. The exact
items required to be included vary from state to state. The North Da-
kota Act presents a relatively typical example:
51-1302(5) The contract shall contain the following items:
a. The cash sale price of the personal property which
is the subject matter of the retail installment sale;
b. The amount of the buyer's down payment, itemiz-
ing the amounts paid in money and in goods and con-
taining a brief description of the goods, if any, traded in;
c. The difference between items a and b;
d. The amount, if any, included for insurance and
other benefits and the cost of each type of coverage or
benefit, except that motor vehicle material damage pre-
miums need not be separately specified;
e. The amount of official fees, as defined in section 1;
f. The principal balance, which is the sum of items
c, d, and e;
g. The amount of the credit service charge;
h. The time balance, which is the sum of items f and
g, payable in installments by the buyer to the seller, the
number of installments required, the amount of each in-
stallment expressed in dollars and the due date or period
thereof;
i. The time sale price.
j. If any installment substantially exceeds in amount
83 See Chart E.
84 CAL. LAWS OF 1959, ch. 201, §1803.1; DEL. LAWS OF 1959, H. B. No. .550, §1403;
IND. STAT. ANN. §58-902 (1951); N. Y. Pza. PROP. LAW §402(1); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN., §1377.02.
85 Ibid.
86 CAL. LAWS OF 1959, ch. 201, §1803.1; DEL. LAWS OF 1959, H. B. No. 550, §4303;
KAN. LAWS SPEc. SESS. (1958), ch. 9 §16-507(g), and N. D. LAWS OF 1957,
§51-1302(2) all require 8 point type; FLA. STAT. ANN. §520.34 (Supp. 1958)
requires at least 6 point type; CONN. GEN. STAT. §42-48(c) (1958) requires
10 point type.
87 FLA. STAT. ANN. §520.34(1) (Supp. 1958) and KAN. LAWS SPEC. SEss. (1958),
ch. 9 §16-507(g) requires a "Notice to the Buyer" to be in at least 10 point
type. N. D. LAWS OF 1957, §51-1302(2) requires certain other portions to be in
at least 10 point type.
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any prior installment other than the down payment, the
following legend printed in at least ten-point bold type
or typewritten: "THIS CONTRACT IS NOT PAY-
ABLE IN INSTALLMENTS OF EQUAL
AMOUNT," followed, if there be but one larger install-
ment, by: "AN INSTALLMENT OF $ ..............
WILL BE DUE ON .......................... ," or,
if there be more than one larger installment, by: "LARG-
ER INSTALLMENTS WILL BE DUE AS FOL-
LOW S: ......................... in such latter case
inserting the amount of every larger installment and its
due date.
The items need not be stated in the sequence or order
set forth above; additional items may be included to ex-
plain the calculations involved in determining the stated
time balance to be paid by the buyer.
The amount of the credit service charge may be ex-
pressed as a simple interest charge not exceeding seven
percent per year computed on the principal balance un-
paid from time to time; if so expressed, the time bal-
ance and the time sale price need not be set forth." '
Another provision commonly found in the various acts and one that
can be grouped with the disclosure provision is the prohibition against
the seller's obtaining the buyer's signature to a contract while it contains
blank spaces.8 9
IV. Copy To The Buyer
Supplementing the disclosure requirement and based upon the same
philosophy is the requirement that a completed copy of the contract be
given to the buyer. Such a requirement is found in practically every
state.90 The problem with these statutes is that an acknowledgment of re-
ceipt of a copy of the contract by the buyer contained in the contract
which the buyer signs, will bind the buyer and the statute will prohibit
collateral evidence to the contrary.9 Thus such acknowledgements are
required to be printed in larger type. However, it remains questionable
as to just how much protection these provisions afford.
V. Receipt
These provisions essentially are a part of the disclosure requirement.
They are, however, distinguishable in that they operate at a different
time. That is, they operate at some time subsequent to the time of con-
tracting. Typically there are two distinct facets to these provisions. The
88 N. D. LAWS OF 1957, §51-1302 (5).
89 ILL. REV. STAT, ch. 121Y §229. permits "... that if delivery of the goods is not
made at the time of execution of the contract, the identifying numbers or
marks or similar information and the date of the first installment may be
inserted in the contract after its execution."
90 See Chart E.
91 CAi- LAWS OF 1959, ch. 201 §1803.7; Note that in Ohio, for example, an ac-
knowledgment is only prima-facie proof of delivery. OHio REV. CODE ANN.,§1317.02 (1957). This would seem to be the better rule but, because of the evi-
denciary difficulties there may be little substantive difference.
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seller or the holder, if he be other than the seller, is required upon re-
quest of the buyer to supply a written statement of the dates and
amounts of payments due and the total amount due upon the contract.
9 2
He is also required upon request to supply receipts for cash payments? 3
In addition, the seller or holder is required to mark canceled or paid the
original evidence of indebtedness and to return the same to the buyer
upon payment in full.9 4 Some states impose only the latter obligation on
the holder.95
VI. Regulation of Charges
This is one of the basic provisions of these acts. Rate regulation
along with disclosure represent the dual pillars of the acts and at the
same time represent completely opposite though not inconsistent phil-
osophies. The philosophy here is that the buyer, even though fully
appraised of the provisions of the contract into which he is about
to enter, is not fully capable of self-protection. Thus the state limits the
profit which the financer can take on such a transaction.
NAME OF STATE MAXIMUM TIME PRICE DIFFERENTIAL MINIMUM TIME PRICE DIFFERENTIAL
California 5/6 of 1% per month-1000 $12.00, but if due date of last
or less. 2/3 of 1% per month installment is 8 months or less,
on balances exceeding $1000. $10.00.
Colorado $15.00 per $100 per year on bal- $10.00
ances of $300 or less-1 2.00
per $100 per year on that por-
tion of balance over $300 up
to $1000-$10.00 per $100 per
year on that portion of balance
over $1000.
Connecticut Disclosure provisions only-rates not regulated.
Motor vehicle rates regulated.
Delaware 5/6 of 1% per month-1000 $12.00, but 'if due date of last
or less. 2/3 of 1% per month installment is 8 months or less,
on balances exceeding $1000. $10.00.
Florida $10.00 per $100 per year. $15.00
Hawaii Same as Industrial Loan Act. $15.00
Illinois Disclosure provisions only-rates not regulated.
Indiana $12.00 per $100 per year. $5.00
Set by Department.
Kansas $12.00 per $100 per year on bal- $15.00
ances of $300 or less. $9.00 per
$100 per year on that part of
balance 'exceeding $300, but
less than $1000. $8.00 per $100
per year on that part of balance
over $1000.
Maryland Disclosure provisions only-rates not regulated.
Motor vehicle rates regulated.
Massachusetts Disclosure provisions only-rates not regulated.
Montana $11.00 per $100 per year on bal- $20.00
ances of $300 or less. $9.00 per
92 CONN. GEN. STAT., 1§42-94 (1958).
3 Ibid.94 CoNx. GEN. STAT., §42.95 (1958).
95NEB. REV. STAT. ANN., §45-302 (Cum. Supp. 1957).
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$100 per year on that part of
balance exceeding $300, but less
than $1000. $7.00 per $100 per
year on that part of balance
over $1000.
Nebraska $12.00 per $100 per year on bal-
ances of $300 or less. $10.00
per $100 per year on that part
of balance exceeding $300, but
less than $1000. $8.00 per $100
per year on that part of bal-
ance over $1000.
New Jersey $10.00 per $100 per year.
New York $10.00 per $100 per year on that
part of balance not exceeding
$500. $8.00 per $100 per year
on that part of balance over
$500.
North Dakota $10.00 per $100 per annum.
Ohio $8.00 per $100 per year plus
50c per month for the first
$50.00 unit and 25c per month
for each of the next 5-$50.00
units.
Utah 1% of the unpaid balance mul-
tiplied by the number of months
of the contract.
If balance is less than $100 and
contract life does not exceed
12 months, 75c per each $5.00
or portion thereof.
$12.00 if contract life more
than 8 months ($10.00 if con-
tract life 8 months or less.)
$12.00 if contract life exceeds
8 months-10.00 if contract
life is less than 8 months.
$15.00, on the assumption that
the acquisition cost allowance
on refunds is applicable.
$15.00
$5.00
It should also be noted here that many states have an additional
provision requiring that ". . . the service charge shall be inclusive of all
charges incident to investigation and making the contract and for the
extension of credit provided in the contract and no fee, expense or
other charge whatsoever shall be taken except as otherwise provided in
this act .... "6 The seller is also limited to the "effective rate" allowed by
statute where the payments are unequal or irregular.9 7 The seller is
further prohibited from in any way dividing the payments so as to re-
ceive a higher rate.98
VII. Insurance Provisions
The seller is commonly expressly authorized by the various acts to
make a separate charge for insurance although he is regulated in this
as to amount and as to disclosure of such a charge. 9 The California
statute is a good example. 100 Thus if the cost of insurance is included
in the contract and a separate charge is made for such insurance, the
contract must state whether the buyer or the seller is to pay for the in-
surance; the rate charged for such insurance shall not exceed the pre-
miums chargeable by the insurer; the seller must deliver a copy of the
96 DEL. LAWS OF 1959, H. B. 550, §4318.
97 DEL. LAWS OF 1959, H. B. 550, §4317.
98 DEL. LAWS OF 1959, H.B. 550, §4319.
99 See Chart E.
1o0 CAL. LAWS OF 1959, ch. 201 §1803.5.
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insurance to the buyer; and the provisions of the insurance code will
apply to any violations.
VIII. Prepayment Rights
Every state which has enacted a retail installment sales act has ex-
pressly granted the buyer the right to make prepayments. 10 The buyer
is always given the unconditional right to prepay in full before maturity
which prepayment entitles him to a refund credit for such anticipation.
The question is how great a refund. Colorado provides that the amount
of such refund shall be at least as great a proportion of the time price
differential as the sum of the monthly time balances after the date of
the prepayment in full bears to the sum of all the monthly time balances
under the schedule of payments in the contract less a deduction there-
from of an acquisition cost of $5.00 per $100 or a fraction thereof, of
the amount of the base time price but not in excess of $15.00.102 Thus
the buyer is entitled to the return of all financing charges applicable to
the time subsequent to prepayment less a deduction not to exceed $15.00.
This is the general rule. 0 3 This right to prepayment is a basic right and
is essential to achieve the purposes of the retail sales installment act.
IX. Refinancing
The purpose of provisions of this type is to protect the buyer's rights
in the event that the parties agree to a refinancing. The typical statute
indicates that the request for such an extension must come from the
buyer,0 4 but it would seem doubtful that such a provision would have
any substantial effect. The principal purpose of these sections is to
limit the amount of additional charges that the buyer can take for such
refinancing. 0 5 California and New York have an additional provision
allowing the seller or holder to extend the scheduled due date or defer
the scheduled payment of all or any part of any installment0 0 North
Dakota has only the latter type provision. 117 The distinction between the
former and the latter is that the latter is not a new contract or a new
size of payment; it is a simple deferral of the then due payments. Cali-
fornia and New York allow the financier who defers payment to collect
simple interest at the rate of one percent,'08 while North Dakota allows
101 See Chart E.
'10 COL. LAWS OF 1959, H. B. 309, §8.
103 IND. STAT. ANN. §58-906 leaves the amount of the refund to the department;
KAN. LAWS SPEC. SEss. 1958, ch. 9 §16-509-when the amount of refund is less
than $1.00 no refund need be made.
104 KAN. LAWS SPEC. SESS. 1958, ch. 9 §16-510.
'10 CAL. LAws OF 1959, ch. 201 §1807.2; KAN. LAWS SPEC. SEss. 1958, ch. 9
§16-510; N. Y. PER PROP. LAW §409(2); all limit the refinancing charge to
the rate permitted in the original contract. CONN. GEN. STAT., §42-97 (1958)
permits a true rate of interest of 12% per annum; N. J. LAWS OF 1960, ch.
40 §44 allows a rate between 1 and 2 percent depending upon classification.
10 6CAL. LAWS OF 1959, ch. 201 §1807.1; N. Y. PmR. PROP. LAw §409(1).
107 N. D. LAWS OF 1957 §51-1306.
308 Supra note 106.
1962]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEI
him a flat fee not to exceed $5.00 plus simple interest at one percent. 1°9
It should be noted that only seven states have statutes which specifi-
cally authorize refinancing.110 However, it would seem that in the ab-
sence of such specific authorization parties could contract to refinance
at the same rates allowed by the act on the original transaction. On the
other hand, the North Dakota statute would seem to leave the situation
in doubt. The statute allowing the deferment would seem to infer that
refinancing is prohibited.
X. Add On Contracts
The add on contract is closely allied with the refinancing arrange-
ment but differs from it in that there are additional purchases. It should
also be distinguished from the retail installment account. [Discussed
infra. ] The provisions relative to add on contracts permit a retail install-
ment contract which otherwise conforms to the requirements of the act
to contain provision that the seller may at his option add subsequent
purchases made by the buyer to the contract with a corresponding in-
drease in payments and in the price of the goods covered by the contract.
The seller may also treat the prior goods as security for the latter but
only until the prior goods are completely paid for. Payments are allo-
cated among the goods by either of two methods: 1.) in same proportion
as the various cash sale prices bear to one another, or 2.) by treating
the amount by which the payments are increased by reason of the add
on purchase as attributable to the goods added on and the remainder
to the original goods.11 ' The service charge is essentially limited to the
same rate as that allowed on the original contract but there are some
difficulties in the computation. 1
The acts commonly provide for substantially the same disclosure
provisions and for copies of the memorandum to be delivered to the
buyer.' 31
XI. Assignment
Provisions of the acts regulating the assignment of retail sales paper
thereunder are enacted to allow free assignment but with maximum
protection to the retail buyer, obligor on the assigned paper. Thus most
109 Supra note 107.
110 See Chart E.
11 CAL. LAWS OF 1959, cl. 201 §1808.
112 CAL. LAws OF 1959, ch. 201 §1808.5 permits the service charge of be figured on
either: 1) the consolidated total (subsequent contract plus unpaid balance of
the previous contract less a refund credit for anticipation) for a period from
the subsequent contract to the date of the final payment, or 2) the principal
balance of the subsequent contract from the date of the subsequent contract
to the date of the final payment on the consolidated total and if the due date
of the consolidated total is later than the due date of any previous contract,
on the time balance then unpaid on such contract from the date when the final
installment thereof was payable to the date when the final installment of such
consolidated total is payable.
113 CAL. LAWS OF 1959, ch. 201 §1808.3; DEL. LAWS OF 1959, H. B. 550 §4329; N. J.
LAWS OF 1960, ch. 40 §28.
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acts include the specific provision that payment by the retail buyer with-
out notice of assignment to the last known holder discharges the buyer
to the extent of the payment."4
XII. Repossession and Resale
In those states that have enacted provisions regulating repossession
and resale there is a certain degree of uniformity. The seller is author-
ized to retake the goods if he can do so without a breach of the peace,
otherwise by legal process." 5 The buyer is given a right of redemption
for a period of ten" 6 to fifteen" 7 days from the date of repossession.
However, the seller can cut off the buyer's right of redemption by serv-
ing upon the buyer written notice of his intention to retake.", The
seller is compelled to resell at public sale where the buyer has paid 50%
or more of the time sale price." 9 Where the buyer has not paid at least
50% of the purchase price either of the parties can force a resale. 20
The seller may recover a deficiency from the buyer where there has
been a resale but where there is no resale the buyer is discharged.' 2'
XIII. Consequence of Violation
The consequences of violation of the provisions of the acts generally
take some combination of the following four different forms: 1.) the
violator is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by fine of up to $100022
or one year imprisonment,' 23 (to be liable to prosecution for the criminal
penalty the violation must be willful) ; 2.) the provisions of the contract
which are in violation of the act will be held to be void but severable
from the remainder of the contract ;121 3.) the seller is held to forfeit
his right to any financing charge, (Nebraska in addition prohibits the
seller from collecting the first $4000 of the principal balance) ;'2' and
4.) the seller is made liable to the buyer for three times the total time
price differential or charges plus delinquency collection or refinancing
charges imposed. 26
XIV. Prohibited Clauses
Several of the acts prohibit the seller from including in the contract
certain provisions. The philosophy of these sections is that the buyer is
not capable of grasping the import of these provisions and even if he
were, the buyer is unable to force the seller to delete them from the con-
tract. Some of the prohibited clauses are: 1.) acceleration clauses pro-
14 DEL. LAWS OF 1959, H. B. 550 §4320.
"'5 CONN. GEN. STAT. §42-98 (a) (1958).
116 CAL. LAws OF 1959, ch. 201 §1812.2.
118 CONN. GEN. STAT. §42-98(g) (1958).
119 CONN. GEN. STAT., §42-98(d) (1958).
120 CONN. GEN. STAT., §42-98(e) (1958).
121 CONN. GEN. STAT., §42-98(g) & (h) (1958).
122 COL. LAWS OF 1959, H. B. 308, §8.
123 IND. STAT. ANN., §58-929 (1951).
124 CAL. LAWs OF 1959, ch. 201 §1804.4.
125 NE. REv. STAT. ANN., §45-311 (Cum. Supp. 1957).
128 DEL. LAWS OF 1959, H. B. 550, §4350.
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viding for the arbitrary or unreasonable acceleration of maturity ;127
2.) cognovit provisions ;128 3.) clauses allowing repossession in breach of
the peace ;129 4.) clauses making a person the buyer's agent for collection
or repossession;130 5.) wage assignments ;131 and 6.) clauses waiving a
buyer's claims against the seller or waiving a defense.132 North Dakota
also prohibits any clause which would allow the seller any security in
property other than the subject matter of the contract. 133
XV. Delinquency and Penalty
These provisions most commonly allow the seller to collect a de-
linquency charge of 5% if the payment is more than 10 days late with
a minimum charge ranging from 25c in Colorado"14 to $1.00 in Cali-
fornia 13 and most other states. The seller is also allowed to collect
attorney's fees of 15% in Connecticut, 136 of a reasonable amount in
Florida 137 and of 20% in New Jersey. 138 No attorney's fees are allowed
in California. 13
9
B. REVOLVING CREDIT ACCOUNTS
Would a retail installment sales act regulate a revolving credit ac-
count plan? It seems that a particular act might cover such plans.
If a revolving credit plan involves retail installment sales se-
cured by retention of title to or a lien on the goods sold, the plan
is subject to the (Illinois) act. Section 26, which permits addition
to and consolidation of contracts and Section 3 (9) which permits
the financing charge to be stated as a percentage of the monthly
unpaid balance, seems to be particularly adopted to such a plan.140
However, it would seem that a statute such as this would leave the
seller with the power to choose between regulation under the act or
freedom from it. The seller could free himself of regulation by simply
not claiming any security in the goods sold and since the typical revolv-
ing credit account sale involves items of relatively small value such a
waiver of security interest in the goods sold would not be a serious
deterrent.
127 CAL. LAWS OF 1959, ch. 201 §1904.1 (g) ; DEL. LAWS OF 1959, H. B. 550, §4311 (g);
MD. ANN. CODE, art. 83 §130(d) (1957); N.Y. PER. PROP. LAW, §403 (3) (b).
12 CAL. LAWS OF 1959, ch. 201 §1804.1(c) ; N. Y. PER. PROP. LAW, §403(3) (c).
129 DEL. LAWS OF 1959, H. B. 550, §4311 (d).
130 CAL. LAWS OF 1959, ch. 201 §1804.1(f); DEL. LAWS OF 1959, H. B. 550,
§4311(i) ; MD. ANN. CODE, art. 83 §83-130(f) ; N. Y. PER. PROP. LAW, §403 (3)
(d).
131 2\D. ANN. CODE, art. 83 §83-130(g) ; N. D. LAWS OF 1957, §51-1302(13).
132DEL. LAWS OF 1959, H. B. 550, §4311(a) & (b); N. Y. PER. PROP. LAW
§403 (3) (a).
13 N. D. LAWS OF 1957, §51-1302(16).
134 COL. LAW OF 1959, H. B. 308, §7.
"35 CAL. LAWS OF 1959, ch. 201 §1803.6.
136 CONN. GEN. STAT., §42-91 (1958).
137 FLA. STAT. ANN., §520.37 (Supp. 1958).
138 N. J. LAWS OF 1960, ch. 40 §42.
139 CAL. LAWS OF 1959, ch. 201 §1803.6.
140 Supra note 67.
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Thus the best course would seem to be enactment of separate pro-
visions regulating credit accounts. This would have the merit of lending
certainty to the law as well as allowing the regulations to take into ac-
count the obvious differences between revolving credit accounts and the
normal retail installment sale. Such provisions have been enacted in
California, Delaware, Florida, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota and
Ohio. The following chart indicates the rates allowed by such states:
NAME OF
STATE
California
Delaware
Florida
Nebraska
New York
North Dakota
Ohio
MAXIMUM RATES
1y2% per month on balances of
$1000 or less-1% per month on
that portion of balance exceeding
$1000.
I5/i% per month on balances of
$1000 or less-ly% per month on
that portion of balance exceeding
$1000.
15c per $10.00 per month.
1%% per month.
1l52% per month on balances up to
$500-1 % per month on the excess
of the balance over $500.
1 2% per month.
50c per $50.00 per month of finance
charge plus service charge of 50c per
$50.00 per month for the first 4-
$50.00 units and 25c per $50.00 per
month for the next 4-$50.00 units.
MINIMUM
RATES
$1.00 per month
$1.00 per month
$1.00
None
70c
None
$1.00
C. MOTOR VEHICLE AcTs
Several states have acts which regulate only the retail installment
sale of motor vehicles.' 41 Maryland and Connecticut have acts which
cover all goods but which regulate the financing charges only on the
motor vehicle installment sales. Wisconsin was the first to enact such
legislation and has set the pattern for the other states.1
42
The Wisconsin act' 43 divides motor vehicles into four classes: 1.)
new vehicles-on which a financing charge of $7.00 per $100 per annum
is permitted); 2.) vehicles not more than 2 years old-on which a
financing charge of $9.00 per $100 per annum is permitted; 3.) vehicles
not more than 5 years old-on which a charge of $12.00 per $100 per
annum is permitted; and 4.) all other vehicles-on which a charge of
141 Supra note 66, at 553.
142 Supra note 65.
'143 Wis. STAT., §218.01(6) (1959).
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$15.00 per $100 per annum is permitted. This classification of the auto-
mobile based upon its age recognizes the seller's higher security risk on
older automobiles. This is the pattern followed by the majority of the
states but California, Nevada and Utah have no such graduation on the
basis of obsolescence. 144 The rates permitted by the various acts vary
from state to state. On current model automobiles the rates range from
$6.00 per $100 in Michigan and Pennsylvania to $9.00 per $100 in
Kentucky and Maryland. On older vehicles the rates range to $17.00
per $100 on automobiles four years old in Florida.14 5
The Wisconsin statute146 also provides for licensing of both the
installment seller and the finance companies. A willful failure to comply
with the licensing provisions will be a valid defense to an action for the
principal balance, the time price differential, interest and other fees.
The Wisconsin statute also requires disclosure and that the buyer be
given a copy of the contract. A violation of the disclosure provision
or of the provision setting the amount of the time price differential will
bar recovery of any time price differential.
VI. CONCLUSION
It has been the purpose of this article to trace the historical devel-
opment of retail installment credit regulations, and to compare legis-
lation enacted by different states and draw the common elements there-
from.
To propose specific legislation in the area of installment sales was
beyond the scope of this article. This must be done by the proper state
legislative committee. However, the authors feel that in formulating
such legislation, consideration should be given to the possible depressing
effect of excessively stringent regulation on the economy. Common sense
seems to dictate that radical curtailment of the amount of installment
sales would have an adverse effect of the overall economy. Regulation
should be directed toward protection of the buyer, rather than control
of the amount of consumer credit.
In addition, it is felt that in any comprehensive scheme of regulation
separate provisions should be made for automobile sales financing, re-
volving credit plans and so called "all goods" financing. Each involves
separate problems meriting individual consideration.
That the purchaser needs some protection seems fairly certain. The
19th century social stigma attached to being in debt, no longer operates
as a sanction to protect the consumer. The authors feel that protection
given to the purchaser should primarily take the form of disclosure pro-
visions where possible. Particular attention should also be given to
144 Warren, Regulation of Financing Charges in Rental Installent Sales, 68
YALE L. J. 839 (1957).
145 Ibid.
146 Supra note 143.
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licensing requirements and a maximum rate of interest. However, the
maximum rate should give adequate leeway for the forces of competi-
tion to establish the rates within the maximum.
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